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UNITED STATES Federal/Civil Timely per extn 
SU~~RY: These curve-lined petitions raise Speech and Debate Clause 
problems. In No. 78-349, the Government seeks review of theCA's ruling 
that it may not introduce any evidence containing references to past 
legislative acts of Congressman Helstoski. In No. 78-546, Helstoski 
contends the CA should have granted him a writ of mandamus directing 
the district court to dismiss an indictment charging him with 
conspiring to violate the official bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 20l(c) (1) 
. r 
and with three substantive violations of that statute. 
. -. 
'. 
I' FACT: At the time of indictment, and at all times 
specified therein, Helstoski was a member of the United States 
House of Representatives. In June 1976, he was charged in a 
four-count indictment. Count I charges a violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371, and alleges that Helstoski conspired to violate 
18 U.S.C. § 201 (c) (1) by soliciting and obt::dning bribes from 
resident aliens for introducing private immigration bills in ·---the House. Four of the sixteen overt acts specified in the 
indictment allege Helstoski introduced particular bills in the 
House to benefit named individuals. Counts II-IV charge the 
defendant with soliciting and obtaining money from certain 
aliens for introducing private legislation on their behalf. 
The underlying indictment grew out of eight grand jury 
investigations that covered a two-year span and resulted in 
several indictments and convictions of persons associated with 
Helstoski. 
Helstoski voluntarily testified before several of those 
grand juries. In his testimony, he described his motives for ----
introducing the bills, the procedures by which he presented the 
bills in the House, and the procedures used by his office in 
handling requests for private immi9ration bills. Helstoski 
also voluntarily produced copies of the bills and voluminous 
correspondence concerning them. Prior to his first grand jury 
appearance and on each subsequent appearance, Helstoski was 
\
advised of his right not to incriminate himself and of his 
right to counsel. He also was told that he was not under 
complusion to produce any documents, and that anything he did 
produce might be used against him. It was not until 
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Helstoski's last appearance before the grand jury in May 1976 
~ 
that he asserted any Speech and Debate Clause immunity, after 
the Government had refused to answer his inquiry as to whether 
he was a target of the grand jury's probe. At non~ of 
I 
Belstoski's prior appearances was he ever specifically advised 
of his Speech and Debate Clause privilege. 
After the indictment was filed, Helstoski moved to dismiss 
it on the ground that, in charging bribery and conspiracy to 
solicit and accept bribes for the performance of particularly 
alleged legislative acts, the indictment was facially invalid 
under the Speech and Debate Clause. After the DC denied this 
motion, the Government filed a motion in limine seeking a 
pretrial ruling on the admissibility of particular items of 
evidence, including the expected testimony of various witnesses 
and more than 200 documents obtained from the files turned over 
by Helstoski.!/ Rather than rule on each item of evidence 
offered, the DC held generally that the Speech and Debate 
Clause precluded introduction of ~ evidence of a past ----- --------.:..::..~----------
legislative act of the defendant. The DC then turned to the 
-----·-~------
Government's claim that Helstoski had waived his Speech and 
Debate Clause immunity. Finding it unnecessary to decide the 
question of whether an individual legislator could waive the 
Speech and Debate Clause privilege, the DC ruled that, if such 
a waiver were possible, it was so 
1/ Representative samples of the evidence at issue have been 
submitted under seal in a special appendix filed with the 
Court. Helstoski has filed his own appendix under seal, which 
contains an affidavit before the DC that controverts the 
Government's contentions as to what the witnesses' testimony 
will be. 
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"only where it has been clearly demonstrated that a 
legislator has expressly waived h~s •.. immunity for the 
precise purposes for which the Government seeks to use the 
evidence of his legislative acts." 
And, under that standard, Helstoski had not waived his rights. 
The Government then appealed the DC's ruling to the CA 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, and Helstoski filed a petition for a 
writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling the DC to dismiss 
the indictment. 
HOLDINGS BELOW: On appeal Helstoski argued that he was 
clearly entitled to a writ of mandamus directing dismissal of 
the indictment because it charged him with the performance of 
legislative acts, namely, the introduction of the private bills 
r- referred to in the particular counts charged. As the 
indictment thus required proof of the performance of 
legislative acts, it infringed the Speech and Debate Clause on 
its face. Alternatively, Helstoski argued that the indictment 
was invalid because it was returned by a grand jury that had 
heard evidence privileged under the Clause. Finally, he argued 
that the DC had "constructively amended" the indictment in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment by prohibiting the Government 
from proving what it had alleged in the indictment, i.e., the 
performance of legislative acts. 
The CA held that, although it had jurisdiction to issue the 
writ sought, mandamus was an "extraordinary" remedy that was to 
be issued only in "exceptional circumstances" amounting to a 
judicial "usurpation of pow.er." Kerr v. United States District 
Court, 426 u.s. 394, 402 (1976). Issusance of a writ of 
mandamus was, in large measure, "a ma~ter of discretion" that 
was called for only when the party seeking the writ had no 
other remedy and had shown a clear right to the relief sought. 
Id. at 403. 
The court held that issuance of the writ sought would be 
inappropriate in the circumstances of this case. The 
indictment at issue was not materially distinguishable from the 
one upheld by this Court in United States v. Brewster, 408 u.s. 
501 (1972), and all the Government was required to prove to 
support its case was the taking of the bribes alleged, not the 
performance of any of the legislative acts mentioned therein. 
The indictment, moreover, was valid on its face and had been 
returned by a competent grand jury. That was all that was 
necessary to establish the DC's jurisdiction to try the 
indictment. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 
(1956). Accordingly, any argument that the Speech and Debate 
Clause required dismissal of an indictment returned by a grand 
jury that had heard evidence privileged by the Clause was 
better left for decision on appeal of a final judgment, for 
such an argument did not go to the jurisdiction of the district 
court to try the case. Finally, the DC's evidentiary ruling 
did not amount to a "constructive amendment" of the indictment, 
for proof of the defendant's performance of a legislative act 
was not an essential element of the crimes charged. The basic 
_theory of the offense and facts considered by the grand jury, 
~ thus, were unaltered by the DC.'s evidentiary ruling. 
•, '• 
v 
The CA then turned to the Government's appeal of the DC's 
order precluding the Government from pr~senting "evidence of 
the performance of a past legislative act •.. derived from 
any source and for any purpose." At the outset the CA rejected 
Belstoski's contention that no jurisdiction to hear the 
Government's appeal existed under 18 u.s.c. § 3731 because the 
DC had not suppressed or excluded any specific items of 
evidence. That made no difference, said the CA, for the 
statute was to be broadly construed to effectuate its purposes 
and the practical effect of the DC's order was to suppress much 
of the evidence contained in the specific offers of proof made 
below, evidence that "otherwise almost certainly would have 
[been] introduced at trial." 
Turning to the merits, the CA rejected the Government's 
alternative arguments (1) that all its evidence was admissible 
for the limited purpose of proving the defendant's intent in 
taking the bribes: and (2) that at least the correspondence and 
conversations of the defendant that were not themselves 
legislative acts were admissible to prove the defendant's 
purpose in taking the bribes even though such evidence might 
contain references to the performance of past legislative acts. 
Though the CA agreed that Brewster permitted the Government 
to show the defendant's purpose in taking the bribes, the court ,..... 
read Brewster as precl~.?ing the Government from showitfug such 
purpose by proving how the defendant had spoken, debated, voted 
or acted in the Congress. Brewster flatly prohibited "any 
showing" of legislative acts for any purpose. See 408 u.s. at 
526-28. And, the Government could not circumvent this 
requirement by introducing corresponderlce and statements that, 
•though not legislative acts themselves, contain reference to 
past legislative acts." This would permit the Government to 
accomplish indirectly what it was absolutely prohibited from 
doing directly. Finally, the Government's waiver arguments 
were unavailing, for they misconstrued the central purpose of 
the Speech and Debate Clause. The Clause was designed to 
protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring 
the independence of individual legislators. It was not a 
"privilege against non-disclosure" like the attorney-client 
privilege: nor was it designed to prevent the use of unreliable 
evidence like the rule against use of coerced confessions. 
Accordingly, even assuming the privilege could be waived by an 
individual legislator, a question the CA found unnecessary to 
decide, something more than a "voluntariness" standard of 
waiver was required. In view of the separation-of-powers 
principles underlying the Clause, any waiver in the context of 
a criminal prosecution "must be express and for the specific 
purpose for which the evidence of legislative acts is sought to 
be used against the member." Under that standard, no express 
waiver of Helstoski's Speech and Debate Clause privilege could 
be found in the mere fact that he had voluntarily testified and 
produced documents concerning his legislative acts before the 
grand jury. 
CONTENTIONS: The parties essentially reiterate the 
arguments raised and rejected in the courts below. 
------------------- ~ -----------------------~--------~~-------
In No. 546, Helskoski claims the indictment is invalid 
because it charges the performance of specific legislative acts 
privileged under the Speech and Debate Clause, and because it 
was returned by a grand jury that had heard evidence privileged 
under the Clause. He also claims the DC's ruling 
constructively amended the indictment. Finally, he claims 
issuance of a writ of mandamus is necessary because no other 
remedy exist to protect his right under the Speech and Debate 
Clause not to put on trial for performing legislative acts. 
In response, the Government relies on the CA's reasoning 
below, argues that Helskoski has an adequate remedy by way of 
appeal, and contends the CA did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the writ. 
In No. 78-349, the Government again claims that it should 
be allowed to introduce evidence concerning correspondence, 
conversations and acts occurring outside the legislative 
process itself even though such evidence might contain 
references to the performance of past legislative acts. The 
Government relies on Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 
(1972), for the view that acts and conversations occuring 
outside the halls of Congress are unprotected by the Speech and 
Debate Clause. Furthermore, Brewster itself is inconsistent 
with the CA's broad ban on any evidence that simply refers to a 
past legislative act, a ruling that the DC has subsequently 
interpreted to prohibit even evidence of payments of money to 
Helstoski subsequent to any legislative act on the theory that 
the jury might infer performance of the legislative act from 
( 
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receipt of the money. If permitted to stand, the CA's ruling 
will effectively insulate members of Congress from any bribery 
prosecutions. Finally, the Government contends that the CA 
adopted a "waiver" standard that is so strict as to preclude 
any waiver of the Speech and Debate Clause privilege, and that 
is inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit's ruling in United 
States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 780-81 (1976), vacated on other 
grounds, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1977), that a state legislator 
could waive his Speech and Debate Clause privilege by 
voluntarily testifying before a grand jury. 
Belstoski answers that the Speech and Debate Clause 
protects "acts, not actors," and that the Government is 
attempting simply to evade the flat ban on direct or indirect 
proof of legislative acts laid down in Brewster and United 
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). Moreover, he observes 
that there is dispute between the parties as to what the 
testimony of certain witnesses might be. Accordingly, this 
case provides a poor vehicle for resolving the reach of the 
Speech and Debate Clause with respect to specific items of 
evidence, particularly as the DC refused to rule on the 
admissibility of the specific offers of proof made by the 
Government. Finally, Helstoski stresses that he was never 
advised that he was a target of the grand jury proceedings. He 
cooperated fully with the grand juries only because he believed 
that his aide was the target and that no Speech and Debate 
Claus~ immunity existed covering a third-party's crime. See 
Gravel, supra at 628-29. Helstoski notes that, after the 
- 10 _----~--------------------~--~ 
Government refused to answer his inquiry as to whether he was a 
target of the grand jury probes, no further cooperation was 
forthcoming from him. Accordingly, it is absurd to suggest, as 
the Government does, that he ever knowingly or intelligently 
waived his Speech and Debate Clause immunity, even assuming 
such a waiver is possible. 
ANALYSIS: I believe that Brewster leaves open at least two 
issues presented here, namely, whether and under what 
circumstances an individual leg~o~ay waive his Speech and 
Debate Clause immunity, an~ther the prohibition of proof of 
~ 
legislative acts forecloses the use of · any evidence that makes 
incidental reference to legislative acts or permits an 
inference that they have been performed. Moreover, the 
indictment at issue here alleges the performance of legislative 
acts with a particularity not present in the indictment in 
. ·~ 
Brewster. Arguably, the references to the performance of 
particular legislative acts alleged in the indictment does not 
provide cause to distinguish Brewster, for those references can 
be deleted as mere surplusage in that the allegations that 
Helstoski actually introduced private bills in the House are 
not essential to the prosecution's case under 18 u.s.c. 
S 201(c} (1}. The introduction of the private bills, however, 
does appear to be an essential aspect of the conspiracy charged 
in count one of the indictment. And, accordingly, at least 
that count seems troubling in light of United States v. 
Johnson, 383 u.s. 169, 185 {1966}. 
- 11 -~----~~-------------------------
In any event, the issues presented in these petitions seem 
sufficiently important and likely to recur as to warrant the 
Court's attention, whatever one's views on the merits. There 
is not, however, any clear conflict in the Circuits as to the 
issues raised. Craig, on which the Government relies for its 
waiver argument, involved only a state Speech and Debate Clause 
question, and the panel's decision was l ater vacated anyways. 
There are responses. 
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March 27, 1979 
Honorable Michael Rodak, Jr. 
Clerk 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Re: United States v. Helstoski, No. 78-349 
Helstoski v. Meanor, No. 78-546 
Dear Mr. Rodak: 
My response to a question asked during the oral argu-
ment in this case may have left the impression that the 
government has decided to abandon the contentions made in 
Part I(B) of the Brief for the United States, pages 76-
88. The purpose of this letter is to affirm that in all 
respects the position of the United States remains that 
stated in the government's brief. I regret any confusion 
that may have arisen during the oral argument. 
Sincerely yours, 
~ 7(?J1.~L .... f. 
Wade H. McCree, Jr. 
Solicitor General 
cc: Morton Stavis, Esq. 
744 Broad Street 
Newark, New Jersey 07102 
Stanley M. Brand, Esq. 
General Counsel to the Clerk 
U.S. House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
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stated in the government's brief. I regret any confusion 
that may have arisen during the oral argument. 
cc: Morton Stavis, Esq. 
744 Broad Street 
Newark, New Jersey 07102 
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Solicitor General 
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General Counsel to the Clerk 
U.S. House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
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March 28, 1979 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: 78-349 
78-546 
U.S. v. Helstoski 
Helstoski v. Meanor 
I was not surprised to receive the enclosed 
memorandum today from the Solicitor General. When 
he responded on this point, I thought it was one of 
those things that happen when four or five "inquisitors" 
are at you. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-546 
Henry Helstoski, Petitioner, I On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the United States Court 
H. Curtis Meanor, United States of Appeals for the Third 
District Judge, et al. Circuit. 
[June -, 1979] 
MR. CHtEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opmwn of the 
Court. 
The question in this case is whether mandamus is an appro~ 
priate means of challenging the validity of an indictment of a 
Member of Congress on the ground that it violates the Speech 
or Debate Clause of the Constitution.1 The Court of Appeals 
declined to issue the writ. We affirm. 
I 
Petitioner Helstoski served in the United States Congress 
from 1965 through 1976 as a Representative from New Jersey, 
In 1974 the Department of Justice began investigating re,.. 
ported political corruption, including allegations that aliens 
had paid money for the introduction and processing of private 
bills which would suspend the application of the immigration 
laws so as to allow them to remain in this country. 
1 The Speech or Debate Clause provides that "for any Speech or Debate 
in either House, they [the Senators and RepresentativesJ shall not be ques-
tioned in any other Place." Art. I, § 6. 
This case wa~ argued in tandem with No. 78-349, United States v. 
H elstoski, which concerns the restrictions the Speech or Debate Clause 
places on the admissibility of evidence at a trial on charges that a former 
Member of the House accepted money in return for promising to introduce 
and introducing private bills. 
.-
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In June 1976, a grand jury returned a 12-count indictment 
charging Helstoski and others with various criminal acts. 
Only the first four counts are involved in this case. The first 
count charged that Helstoski and others had conspired to 
violate 18 U. S. C. § 201 (c) (1) by accepting money in return 
for Helstoski's "being influenced in the performance of official 
acts, to wit: the introduction of private bills in the United 
States House of Representatives."' The charge recited 16 
overt acts, four of which referred to the actual introduction of 
private bills; a fifth referred to an agreement to introduce a 
private bill. The entire conspiracy was charged as a violation 
of the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S. C. § 371., 
Counts I~ , III, and IV were substantive counts charging 
violations o~ 18 U.S. C. §§ 201 (c) (1) and (2) : 
1'Whoeyer, being a public official ... directly or indirectly, 
corruptJly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, 
receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself 
or for ~:~-ny other person or entity, in return for: 
" ( 1) being influenced in his performance of any official 
act; or 
"(2) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or 
to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for 
the commission of any fraud on the United States; 
"Shall be [fined or imprisoned]." (Emphasis added.) 
"Public official" and "official act" are defined in 18 U. S. C~ 
§ 201: 
" (a) For the purpose of this ~ection: 
" 'public official' means Member of Congress . • . ; and 
" 'official act' means any decision or action on any ques· 
tion, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which 
may at any time be pending, or which may by law be 
brought before any public official, in his official capacity) . 
or in his place of trust or profit.)' 
78-546-0PINION 
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Each count charged that Helstoski, acting through his legis-
lative aide, had solicited money from aliens in return for 
"being influenced in the performance of official acts, to wit: 
the introduction of private bills in the United States House of 
Representatives on behalf of" the aliens. Essentially the 
charges against Helstoski parallel those dealt within United 
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), and United States v. 
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). 
Each count also charged that Helstoski, again acting 
through his aide, had accepted a bribe, "in return for his being 
influenced in the performance of official acts, to wit: the intro-
.duction of private bills in the United States House of Repre-
sentatives on behalf of" the aliens. Finally, each count 
charged that a private bill had been introduced on a particular 
date. 
Helstoski neither appeared before nor submitted material to 
the particular grand jury that returned the indictment. The 
prosecutor provided that grand jury with transcripts of most, 
but not all, of the testimony of witnesses, including Helstoski, 
before eight other grand juries.2 The United States Attorney 
explained that to avoid any possible prejudice to Helstoski he 
had not told the ninth grand jury of Helstoski's invocation of 
his privilege under the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, he 
sought to avoid any challenge resulting from the fact that the 
District Judge had appeared before one grand jury to rule on 
Helstoski's claim of that privilege. 
Helstoski moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that 
the grand jury process had been abused and that the indict-
ment violated the Speech or Debate Cause. He supported his 
allegation of abuse of the grand jury by characterizing the 
·eight grand juries as "discovery tools." The effect, he con-
tended, was to permit the prosecutor to select the information 
presented to the indicting grand jury and to deprive that 
2 The proceedings before the various grand juries are described in 
No. 78-349, United States v. Helstoski . 
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grand jury of evidence of the demeanor of witnesses, especially 
that of Helstoski himself. 
District Judge Meanor denied the motion after examining 
a transcript of the evidence presented to the indicting grand 
jury. He held that there had been no such abuse to justify 
invalidating the indictment. He found that most of the 
material not submitted to the indicting grand jury "was either 
prejudicial to the defendants, or neither inculpating nor 
exculpating in nature." He also found that the testimony of 
two grand jury witnesses should have been presented to the 
indicting grand jury and concluded that Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U. S. 83 (1963), required that the Government provide 
Helstoski with transcripts of their testimony. Judge Meanor 
also held that the Speech or Debate Clause did not require 
dismissal. 
Approximately three months later, in June 1977, Helstoski 
petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus di-
recting the District Court to dismiss the indictment. 
The Court of Appeals declined to issue the writ of man-
damus. 576 F. 2d 511 (CA3 1978). It concluded that the 
indictment in this case was indistinguishable from that in 
United States v. Brewster, supra, where an indictment was 
held not to violate the Speech or Debate Clause even though 
it contained references to legislative acts. The Court of Ap-
peals rejected Helstoski's argument that the indictment was 
invalid because the grand jury had heard evidence of legisla-
tive acts, which he argues was in violation of the Speech or · 
Debate Clause. The court declined · to go behind the indict-
ment holding that it was valid on its face. 
In seeking reversal here of the Court of Appeals' holding, 
Helstoski argues that the extraordinary remedy of mandamus 
is appropriate in this case to protect the constitutional com-
mand of separation of powers. He contends that the Speech 
or Debate Clause assigns exclusive jurisdiction over all legis-
lative acts to Congress. . The indictment itself, he urges, is a 
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violation of that Clause because it represents an impermissible 
assertion of jurisdiction over the legislative function by the 
grand jury and the federal courts. He challenges the validity 
of the indictment on two grounds. First, the indictment itself 
refers to legislative acts. Any attempt at restricting the proof 
at trial, as approved by the Court of Appeals, will amount 
to an amendment of the indictment, thereby violating a Fifth 
Amendment right to be tried only on an indictment in pre-
cisely the form issued by a grand jury. Second, he contends 
the Speech or Debate Clause was violated when the grand jury 
was allowed to consider evidence of his legislative acts not-
withstanding that such evidence and testimony was presented 
by him. 
II 
Almost a hundred years ago this Court explained, "The 
general principle which governs proceedings by mandamus is, 
that whatever can be done without the employment of that 
extraordinary writ, may not be done with it. It lies only 
when there is practically no other remedy." Ex parte Row-
land, 104 U. S. 604, 617 (1882) (emphasis added) . More re-
cently we summarized certain considerations for determining 
whether the writ should issue : 
"Among these are that the party seeking issuance of the 
writ have no other adequate means to attain the relief 
he desires, and that he satisfy 'the burden of showing that 
[his] right to issuance of the writ is "clear and indisputa-
ble." ' Moreover, it is important to remember that issu-
ance of the writ is in large part a matter of discretion 
with the court to which the petition is addressed." Kerr 
v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976) 
(citations omitted) . 
Helstoski contends that his petition for a writ of mandamus 
should not be governed by the rules which we have developed 
for assessing mandamus petitions generally. He argues that 
. - . 
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the writ is especially appropriate for enforcing the commands 
of the Speech or Debate Clause. We agree that the guaran~ 
tees of that Clause are vitally important to our system of 
government and therefore are entitled to be treated by the 
courts with the sensitivity that such important values require. 
We are unwilling, however, to accept the contention that man-
damus is the appropriate vehicle for assuring protection of 
the Clause in the circumstances shown here. Helstoski could 
readily have secured review of the ruling complained of and all 
objectives now sought, by direct appeal to the Court of Ap~ 
peals from the District Court order denying his motion to dis-
miss the indictment. 
Only recently in Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 
( 1977), we held that "pretrial orders rejecting claims of former 
jeopardy . .. constitute 'final decisions' and thus satisfy the 
jurisdictional prerequisites of [28 U. S. C.] § 1291." /d., at 
662. The reasoning undergirding that holding applies with 
particular force here. The language of the Abney opinion is 
particularly apt, even though the context was the Double 
Jeopardy Clause: 
"[T] here can be no doubt that such orders constitute a 
complete, formal and, in the trial court, a final rejection 
of a criminal defendant's double jeopardy claim. There 
are simply no further steps that can be taken in the Dis-
trict Court to avoid the trial the defendant maintains is 
barred by the Fifth Amendment's guarantee." I d., at 
659. 
This is equally true for a claim that an indictment violates 
the fundamental guarantees of the Speech or Debate Clause. 
Once a motion to dismiss is denied there is nothing the Mem-
ber can do under that Clause in the trial court to prevent the 
trial; but it is equally clear an appeal of the District Court 
ruling was available. 
Second, we noted : 
" [T] he very nature of a double jeopardy claim is such that 
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it is collateral to, and separable from, the principal issue 
at the accused's impending criminal trial, i. e., whether 
or not the accused is guilty of the offense charged. In 
arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment bars his prosecution, the defendant makes no 
challenge whatsoever to the merits of the cha.rge against 
him. Nor does he seek suppression of evidence which the 
Government plans to use in obtaining a conviction. 
Rather, he is contesting the very authority of the Gov-
ernment to hale him into court to face trial on the 
charge against him." 3 Ibid. (Emphasis added; cita-
tions omitted.) 
Abney concludes: 
"[T]he rights conferred on a criminal accused by the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause would be significantly undermined if 
appellate review of double jeopardy claims were post-
poned until after conviction and sentence. . . . [T]his 
Court has long recognized that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause protects an individual against more than being 
subjected to double punishments. It is a guarantee 
against being twice put to trial for the same offense.'' 
Id., at 660-661. 
That characterization of the purpose of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause echoed this Court's statement in Dombrowski v. East-
land, 387 U. S. 82, 85 (1967), that the Speech or Debate· 
Clause was designed to protect Congressmen "not only from 
the consequences of litigation's results but also from the bur-
den of defending themselves." 
Here the holding of Abney becomes highly relevant; by 
analogy, if a Member "is to avoid exposure to [being ques-
tioned for acts done in either House] and thereby enjoy the 
8 It is true that Helstoski challenges the admissibility of evidence at his 
trial; that challenge, however, is rai:;ed only if the indictment is allowed to• 
stand. 
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full protection of the Clause, his ... challenge to the indict,. 
ment must be reviewable before ... exposure [to trial] occurs." 
Abney, supra, at 662. 
Helstoski argues that he should not be penalized for failing 
to predict our decision in Abney. But he cannot be viewed 
as being penalizeq since the controlling law of the Third Cir .. 
cuit was announced at the time of the District Court orde:r 
denying dismissal of the indictment, and our holding did no 
more than affirm the correctness of the law of th~:~-t Circuit. See 
United States v. DiSilvio, 520 F. 2d 247, 248 n. 2a, cert. denied, 
423 U. S. 1015 (1975). Cf. United States ·v. Venable, 585 F. 
2d 71, 74-75 (CA3 1978); United States v. Inmon, 568 F. 2d 
326, 329 (CA3 1977) (referring to the "Abney-DiSilvio rule"). 
We hold that if Helstoski wished to challenge the District 
Court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment, direct 
appeal to the 'Court of Appeals was the proper course under 
DeSilvio, supra.4 
Affirmed. 
MR. JusTICE PowELL took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
4 If the petition for a writ of mandamus were treated as an appeal it 
would, of course, have been jurisdictionally out of time. Fed. Rule App. 
Proc. 4. 
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We granted certiorari in this case to resolve important ques-
tions concerning the restrictions the Speech or Debate Clause 1 
places on the admissibility of evidence at a trial on charge$ 
that a former Member of the House had. while a Member, ac-
cepted money in return for promising to introduce and intro-
ducing private bills.2 
I 
Respondent Helstoski is a former Member of the United 
States House of Representative from New Jersey. In 1974, 
while Helstoski was a Member of the House, the Department 
of Justice began investigating reported political corruption, 
including allegations that aliens had paid money for the in-
troduction of private bills which would suspend the applica-
tion of the immigration laws so as to allow them to remain 
in this country. 
1 The Speech or Debate Clause provides that "for any Speech or Debate 
in eithrr House, they [the Senator:-; and Representative~] shall not be 
queRtionrd in any othrr Place" Artirlr 1, § 6. 
2 Th1~ rase wn~ argurcl in landrm with No. 78-546, Helstoski v. Meanor, 
which involve~ 1 hr qu~f ion of whet her mandamu~ is an appropriate means 
of challrnging the validity of an mdict~ent on the ground that it violates 
the Speech or Dr hate Claw;e of the Constituf JOn. 
't ~I' 
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The investigation was carried on before nine grand juries. 
The grand juries were called according to the regular practice 
in the District of New Jersey, which was to have a dift'erent 
grand jury sitting on each of six days during the week; on two 
days there was a second grand jury. When the United States 
Attorney was ready to present evidence he presented it to 
whichever grand jury was sitting that day. There was there-
fore no assurance that any grand jury which voted an indict-
ment would see and hear all of the witnesses or see all of the 
documentary evidence. It was contemplated that the grand 
jury that was asked to return an indictment would review 
transcripts of relevant testimony presented to other grand 
juries. 
Helstoski appeared voluntarily before grand juries on 10 
occasions between April 1974 and May 1976. Each time he 
appeared he was told that he had certain constitutional rights. 
Difl'erent terms were used by difl'erent attorneys for the 
United States, but the following exchange, which occurred at 
Helstoski's first appearance before a grand jury, fairly repre-
sents the several exchanges : 
"Q. You were told at that time [at the office of the 
United States attorney earlier]-and just to repeat them 
today-before we begin you were told that you did not 
have to give any testimony to the Grand Jury or make 
any statements to any officer of the United States. You 
understand that, do you not? 
"A. I come with full and unlimited cooperation. 
"Q. I understand that .... 
"Q. And that you also know that anything that you 
may say to any agent of the United States or to this 
Grand Jury may later be used in a court of law against 
you; you understand that as well? 
[Affirmative response given.] 
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''A. Whatever is in my possession, in my files, in its 
original form, will be turned over. Those files which I 
have-some of them are very, very old. I've been in 
Congress since 1965. We mentioned this. 
"Q. The Grand Jury wants from you simply the records 
that are in your possession, whether it be in your office in 
East Rutherford, New Jersey, Washington, D. C., your 
home, wherever they may be, the Grand Jury would like 
you to present those documents. Of course, you under-
stand if you wish not to present those documents you do 
not have to and that anything you do present may also, 
as I have told you about your personal testimony, may be 
used against you later in a court of law? 
"A. I understand that. Whatever I have will be 
turned over to you with full cooperation of [sic] this 
Grand Jury and with yourself, sir. 
"A. I understand that. I promise full cooperation 
with your office, with the FBI, this Grand Jury. 
"Q. The Grand Jury is appreciative of that fact. They 
also want to make certain that when you are giving this 
cooperation that you understand, as with anyone else 
that might be called before a United States Grand Jury, 
exactly what their constitutional rights are. And that is 
why I have gone through this step by step carefully so 
there will be no question and there will be no doubt in 
anybody's mind. 
"A. As 1 indicated, I come with no request for im-
munity and you can be assured there won't be any plea 
of the Fifth Amendment under any Circumstances." 
Helstoski testified as to his practices in introducing private 
immigration bills and he produced his files on numerous pri-
vate bills. Included in the files were correspondence with a 
former legislative aide and with individuals for whom bills 
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were introduced. He also provided copies of 169 bills intro~ 
ducecl on behalf of various aliens. 
Beginning with his fourth appearance before a grand jury, 
in October 1975, Helstoski objected to the burden imposed by 
the requests for information. The requests, he claimed, vio-
lated his own right of privacy and that of his constituents. In 
that appearance he also stated that there were "some serious 
Constitutional questions" raised by the failure of the United 
States Attorney to return tax records which Helstoski had 
voluntarily delivered. He did not, however, assert a privilege 
against producing documents until the seventh appearance, 
on December 12. 1975. Then he declined to answer ques-
tions, complaining that the United States Attorney had stated 
to the District Court that the grand jury had concluded that 
Helstoski had misapplied campaign funds. He asserted a 
general invocation of rights under the Constitution and specif-
ically listed the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
At the uext, and eighth, appearance on December 29, 1975, 
he repeated his objections to the conduct of the United States 
Attorney. After answering questions about campaign financ-
ing, personal loans, and other topics, he declined to answer 
questions about the receipt of a sum of money. That action 
was based upon his privilege under the Fifth Amendment 
11and on further grounds that to answer that question would 
violate my rights under the Constitution." 
Because the grand jury considered that Helstoski's invoca-
tion of constitutional privileges was too general to be accept-
able it adjourned and reconvened before Judge Meanor to 
seek a ruling 011 Helstoski's claim of privilege "under the Con-
stitution." After questioning Helstoski, Judge Meanor stated 
that the privilege against self-incrimination was the only 
privilege available to Helstoski. The judge assisted Helstoski 
in wording a statement invoking the privilege that was satis-
factory to the grand jury. Thereafter, Helstoski invoked his 
Fifth Amendment privilege in refusing to answer further 
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October 1975, Helstoski complained that he had been served 
with a subpoena directing him to appear before a grand jury 
on a day that Congress was in session." 
At his lOth and final appearance before a grand jury Helsto-
ski invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. But he also re-
ferred repeatedly to "other constitutional privileges which 
prevail." Nevertheless, he continued to promise to produce 
compaign and personal financial records as requested by the 
grand jury and directed by the District Judge. 
II 
In June 1976, a grand jury returned a multiple-count indict-
ment chargiug Helstoski and others with various criminal 
acts. Helstoski moved to dismiss the indictment, contending 
that the grand jury process had been abused and that the in-
dictment violated the Speech or Debate Clause. 
The District Judge denied the motion after examining a 
transcript of the evidence presented to the indicting grand 
jury. He held that the Speech or Debate Clause did not re-
quire dismissal. He also ruled that the Government would 
not be allowed to offer evidence of the actual performance 
of any legislative acts. That ruling prompted the Govern-
ment to file a motion requesting that the judge pass on the 
admissibility of twenty-three categories of evidence. The 
Government urged that a ruling was necessary to avoid the 
possibility of a mistrial. Helstoski opposed the motion, argu-
5 He offered this rxplanation to an A::;sistant United States Attorney : 
"A. [Helstoski] Do you want to get into the Constitutional question of 
whether or not you could serw a member of Congress while Congress is 
in session? 
"You know very wrll that can't be done .... 
"Q. Congressman , you've used the term 'illegal subpoena.' Who told 
you it was illegal'? 
"A. That's my own judgment based on the Constitution and the Rules 
of Procedure of the House of Representatives." 
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ing that the witnesses would not testify as the Government 
indicated in its proffer. 
The District Judge declined to rule separately on each of 
· the categories. Instead, he ordered that 
"the Government may not, during its case-in-chief, intro-
duce evidence, derived from any source and for any pur-
pose, of the past performance of a legislative act by 
defendant Henry Helstoski." (Emphasis added.) 
The Government filed a timely appeal from the evidentiary 
· ruling, relying upon 18 U. S. C. § 3731: 
"An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of 
appeals from a decision or order of a district court sup-
pressing or excluding evidence . .. not made after the 
defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict 
or finding on an indictment or information, if the United 
States attorney certifies to the district court that the ap-
peal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evi-
dence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the 
proceeding. 
"The appeal in all such cases shall be taken within 
thirty days after the decision, judgment or order has been 
rendered and shall be diligently prosecuted. 
"The provisions of this section shall be liberally con~ 
strued to effectuate its purpose." 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's evi-
dentiary ruling. 576 F. 2d 511 (C'A3 1978). It first con-
cluded that an appeal was proper under ~ 3731, relying 
primarily upon its earlier decision in United States v. Beck, 
483 F. 2d 203 (CA3 1973). cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1132 (1974), 
and upon the language in the section mandating that it be 
"liberally construed." 
Turning to the merits of the Government's appeal, the Court 
of Appeals rejected both of the Government's arguments: (a) 
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that legislative acts could be introduced to show motive; and 
(b) that legislative acts could be introduced because Helstoski 
had waived his privilege by testifying before the grand juries. 
The court relied upon language in United States v. Brewster, 
408 U. S. 501, 527 (1972), prohibiting the introduction of evi-
dence as to how a Congressman acted on, voted on, or resolved 
a legislative issue. The court reasoned that to permit evi-
dence of such acts under the guise of showing motive would 
negate the protection afforded by the Speech or Debate 
Clause. 
In holding Helstoski had not waived the protection of the 
Speech or Debate Clause, the Court of Appeals did not decide 
whether the protection could be waived. Rather, it assumed 
that a Member of Congress could waive the privilege, but held 
that any waiver must be "express and for the specific purpose 
for which the evidence of legislative acts is sought to be used 
against the membC'r." 576 F. 2d, at 523-524. Any lesser 
standard, the court reasoned, would frustrate the purpose of 
the ClausC'. Having found on the record before it that no 
waiver was shown, it affirmed the District Court's order under 
which the Government is prC'cluded from introducing evidence 
of past legislative acts in any form. 
In seeking review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
the Government contends that the Speech or Debate Clause 
does not bar the introduction of all evidence referring to past 
legislative acts. It concedes that, absent a waiver, it may 
not introduce the bills themselves. But the Government 
argues that the Clause does not pl'Ohibit it from introducing 
evidence of discussions and correspondence which describe and 
refer to legislative acts if the discussions and correspondence 
did not occur during the legislative process. The Govern-
ment contends that it seeks to introduce such evidence to show 
Helstoski's motive for taking money, not to show his motive 
for introducing the bills. Alternatively, the Government con-
tends that Helstoski waived his protection under the Speech 
'. 
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or Debate Clause when he voluntarily presented evidence to 
the grand juries. Volunteered evidence, the Government 
argues, is admissible at trial regardless of its content. 
Finally, the Government argues, by enacting 18 U. S. C. 
§ 201, Congress has shared its authority with the Executive 
and the Judiciary by express delegation authorizing the indict-
ment and trial of Members who violate that section-in 
short an institutional decision to waive the privilege of the 
Clause. 
III 
The Court's holdings in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 
169 (1966), and United States v. Brewster, supra, leave no 
doubt that eviJence of a legislative act of a Member may not 
be introduced by the Government in a prosecution under 
§ 201.6 In Johnson there had been extensive questioning of 
both Johnson. a former Congressman, and others about a 
speech which Johnson had delivered in the House of Repre-
sentatives and the motive for the speech. The Court's con-
clusion was unequivocal: 
"We see no escape from the conclusion that such an in-
tensive judicial inquiry, made in the course of a prosecu-
6 We agree with the Court of Appeals that 18 U. S. C. § 3731 authorized 
thr Government to appeal the District Court order restricting thr Pvi-
dence that could be used at trial. All of the requisites of § 3731 were 
met. There was an order of a district. court excluding evidence; a United 
States attorney filed the proper certification; and the appeal was taken 
within thirty days. The final clause of § 3731 provides, "The provisions 
of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes." In 
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975), we concluded that the 
purposes of the :;ection were "to remove all statutory barriers to Govern-
ment appeals and to allow appeals whenever the Constitution would per-
mit." See also United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 84-85 (1978); H. R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 91-1768, p. 21, reprinted in 1970 U. S. Cong. Code & 
Admin. News 5842, 5848; S. Rep. No. 91-1296, pp. 2-3 (1970); 116 Cong. 
Rec. 35659 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Hruska). There are no constitu-
tional barriers to this appeal and we conclude that the appeal was author-
ized by § 3731. 
10 
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tion by the Executive Branch under a general conspiracy 
statute, violates the express language of the Constitution 
and the policies which underlie it." 383 U. S., at 177. 
In Brewster, we explained the holding of Johnson in this 
way: 
"Johnson thus stands as a unanimous holding that a 
Member of Congress may be prosecuted under a criminal 
statute provided that the Government's case does not rely 
on legislative acts or the motivation for legislative acts. 
A legislative act has consistently been defined as an act 
generally done in Congress in relation to the business 
before it. In sum, the Speech or Debate Clause prohibits 
inquiry only into those things generally said or done in 
the House or the Senate in the performance of official 
duities and into the motivation for those acts." 408 
U. S., at 512. 
The Government, however, argues that exclusion of refer-
ences to past legislative acts will make prosecutions more diffi-
cult because such references are essential to show the motive 
for taking money. In addition, the Government argues that 
the exclusion of references to past acts is not logically con-
sistent. In its view, if jurors are told of promises to perform 
legislative acts they will infer that the acts were performed, 
thereby calling the acts themselves into question. 
We do not accept the Government's arguments; without 
doubt the exclusion of such evidence will make prosecutions 
more difficult. The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Executive to pros-
ecute a Member of either House for legislative acts. The 
Clause protects "against inquiry into acts that occur in the 
regular course of the legislative process and into the motiva-
tion for those acts." Brewster, supra, at 525. It "precludes 
any showing of how [a legislator] acted, voted, or decided." 
!d., at 527. Promises to perform an act· in the future by a 
Member are not legislative acts. Brewster makes clear that 
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the "compact" may be shown without impinging on the 
legislative function. 
We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that refer-
ences to past legislative acts of a Member cannot be admitted 
without uudermining the values protected by the Clause. 
We implied as much in Brewster when we explained, "To 
make a prima facie case under [the] indictment, the Govern-
ment need not show any act of [Brewster] subsequent to the 
corrupt promise for payment, for it is taking the bribe, not 
performance of the illicit compact, that is a criminal act." 
!d., at 526 (emphasis altered). A similar inference is appro-
priate from Johnson where we held that the Clause was vio-
lated by questions about motive addressed to others than 
Johnson himself. That holding would have been unnecessary 
if the Clause did not afford protection beyond legislative acts 
themselves. 
The Government argues that the prohibition of the intro-
duction of evidence should not apply in this case because the 
protections of the Clause have been waived. The Govern-
ment suggests two sources of waiver, (a) Helstoski's conduct 
and utterances, and (b) the enactment of § 201 by Congress. 
The Government argues that Helstoski waived the protection 
of the Clause by testifying before the grand juries and volun-
tarily producing documentary evidence of legislative acts. 
The Government contends that Helstoski's conduct is suffi-
cient to meet whatever standard is required for a waiver of 
that protection. We cannot agree. 
Like the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we per-
ceive no reason to decide whether an individual Member may 
waive the Speech or Debate Clause's protection against being 
prosecuted for a legislative act. Assuming that is possible, 
we hold that waiver can be found only after explicit and un-
equivocal renunciation ·of the protection. The ordinary rules 
for determining the appropriate standard of waiver do not 
apply in this setting. Compare Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 
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458, 464 (1938) ("intentional relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right or privilege") with Schneckloth v. Busta-
mante, 412 U. S. 218, 248-249 ( 1973) (proof of knowledge not 
req uirf'd for waivf'r). See also Garner v. United States, 424 
u.s. 648, 654 11. 9, 657 (1976). 
The Speech or Debate Clause was designed neither to as-
sure fair trials nor to avoid coercion. Rather, its purpose was 
to preserve the constitutional structure of separate, coequal, 
and independent branches of government. The English and 
American history of the privilege suggest that any lesser 
standard would risk intrusion by the executive and the judi-
ciary into the sphet·e of protected legislative activities. The 
importance of the principle was recognized as early as 1808 
in Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27, where the court said that the 
purpose of the principle was to secure to every member '~ex­
emption from prosecution, for every thing said or clone by 
him. as a representative, in the exercise of the functions ·of 
that office." (Emphasis added.) 
This Court has reiterated the central importance of the 
Clause for preventing intrusion by executive and judiciary 
into the legislative sphere. 
"[I] t is apparent from the history of the clause that the 
privilege was not born primarily of a desire to avoid pri-
vate suits . .. but rather to prevent intimidation by the 
executive and accountability before a possibly hostile 
judiciary. 
"There is little doubt that the instigation of criminal 
charges against critical or disfavored legislators by the 
executive in a judicial forum was the chief fear prompt-
ing the long struggle for parliamentary privilege in Eng-
land and, in the context of the American system of sep-
aration of powers, is the predominate thrust of the Speech 
or Debate Clause." United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S, 
169, 180- 181, 182 (1966). 
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We reaffirmed that principle in Gravel v. United States, 408 
U. S. 606, 618 (1972), when we noted that the "fundamental 
purpose" of the Clause was to free "the legislator from execu-
tive and judicial oversight that realistically threatens to con-
trol his conduct as a legislator." 
On the record before us, Helstoski's words and conduct 
cannot be seen as an explicit and unequivocal waiver of his 
immunity from prosecution for legislative acts-assuming 
such a waiver can be made. The exchanges between Helsto-
ski and the various United States Attorneys indeed indicate a 
willingness to waive the protection of the Fifth Amendment; 
but the Speech or Debate Clause provides a separate, and dis-
tinct, protection which calls for at least as clear and un-
ambiguous expression of waiver. No such showing appears 
on this record. 
The Government also argues that there has been a sort of 
institutional waiver by Congress in enacting § 201. Accord-
ing to the Government, § 201 represents collective a decision 
to enlist the aiel of the Executive Branch and the courts in the 
exercise of Congress' powers under Art. I, § 5, to discipline its 
Members. This Court has twice declined to decide whether 
a Congressman could, consistent with the Clause, be pros-
ecuted for a legislative act as such, provided the prosecution 
were "founded upon a narrowly drawn statute passed by Con-
gress in the exercise of its legislative power to regulate the 
conduct of its members." Johnson, supra, at 185. Brewster, 
supra, at 529 n. 18. We see no occasion to resolve that im-
portant question. We hold only that § 201 does not amount 
to a congressional waiver of the protection of the Clause for 
individual Members. 
Precedent and history suggest important reasons why Con-
gress, as a body, should not be free to strip individual Mem-
bers of the protection guaranteed by the Clause from being 
"questioned" by the executive in the courts. The controversy 
over the Alien and Sedition Acts reminds us how one political 
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party in control of both the Legislative and the Executive 
Branches sought to destroy political opponents in the courts. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted in 
Coffin, "the privilege secured ... is not so much the privi-
lege of the House as an organized body, as of each individual 
member composing it, who is entitled to this privilege, even 
against the declared will of the house." 4 Mass., at 27 (em-
phasis added). In a similar vein in Brewster we stated: 
"The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were 
not written into the Constitution simply for the personal 
or private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect 
the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the in-
dependence of individual legislators." 408 U. S., at 507 
(emphasis added). 
See also id., at 524. We perceive no reason to undertake 
consideration of the Clause in terms of separating the Mem-
bers' rights from the rights of the body. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Congress could constitution-
ally waive the protection of the Clause for individual Mem-
bers, such waiver could be shown only by an explicit and 
unequivocal expression. There is no evidence of such a 
waiver in the language or the legislative history of § 201 or 
any of its predecessors.7 
7 Seetion 201 was enacted in 1962. Pub. L. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119. It 
replaced a sect ion that had remained unchanged since it:; original rnact-
ment in 1862. Ch. 180, 12 Stat. 577. See Hev. Stat. § 1781, 18 U.S. C. 
§ 205 (1958 ed.). Thr debatrs on the 1862 act reveal no di::;cu::;sion of 
the Speech or Debate Privilege. See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d 
Se.·s., 3260 (1862). As explained in the HouRe Heport accompanying the 
1962 act, the purpose of the act was "to render uniform the law describ-
ing a bribe and pre::;cribing the intent or purpo::;e which makes it::; transfer 
unlawful." H. R. Rep. ~o. 748, 87th Cong., 1st Ses::;., 15 (1961). The 
Senate Heport expnnded the rxplanation and said thnt a purpose of the 
act wn,.; the "::;ubstitution of a Ringle romprehrn::;ive section of the Criminal 
Code for a number of exi:;ting ~tatutrs conrerned with bribery. This con-
solidafion would make no siguific:ant changr~:; of substance and, more par-
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We conclude that there was neither individual nor institu-
tional waiver and that the evidentiary barriers erected by the 
Speech or Debate Clause must stand. Accordingly, the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
MR. Jus'ricE PowELL took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
ticu!arly, would not r<'~lrict thr broad ~;cope of the present bribrry statutes 
as construed by the courts ." S. Rep. No. 22131 87th Cong., 2d Ses:s., 4 
(1962) . 
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